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Abstract 
This paper examined the effect of membership composition on the components of group! 
designed to provide fmancial services, and on the performance of these groups. Regressior 
results based on data from RoSCAs in The Gambia show that gender homogeneity is less like!) 
to affect components of group design than is homogeneity in income generating capacity oJ 
members. Membership homogeniety does not directly affect the repayment performance of the 
members but only indirectly through the components of the group design. 
DOES ME:M:BERSIDP HOMOGENEITY MA TIER FOR GROUP BASED 
FINANCIAL SERVICES? EVIDENCE FROM THE GAMBIA 
by 
Geetha Nagarajan, Richard L. Meyer and Douglas H. Graham 
I. Introduction 
Formal financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have proven to be inefficient and costly 
in providing financial services, especially for small enterprises and the poor. But several types 
of informal finance efficiently service a wide variety of borrowers denied access to formal finance. 
Informal fmancial services are provided through diverse types of individual and group 
arrangements. Many of the indigenous group arrangements are designed as rotating savings and 
credit associations, while others are non-rotating in nature. Indigenous groups are often observed 
to be fairly homogenous in their membership composition and this homogeneity is expected to be 
an important aspect which contributes to their sustainability1• 
Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become active in providing financial 
services in The Gambia through organizing groups of persons to save and/or borrow together 2• 
This form of finance is potentially important because of the absence of formal banks in many 
areas, and their lack of interest in attempting to serve low income people. The majority of the 
groups formed by NGOs have fairly homogenous members 3• However, NGOs face problems in 
determining which of several possible member characteristics should be homogenous; they incur 
high costs in forming groups with relatively homogenous members on the assumption that 
homogeneity contributes to sustainability. Furthermore, membership heterogeneity may have 
some unrecognized advantages. Heterogeneity may have two advantages in reducing both 
congestion among members in using group services, and delinquency and default risks due to 
covariance in their incomes 4 • Some NGOs, therefore, are attempting to introduce member 
1 See Bouman, Frits, "ROSCA and ASCRA: Beyond the Financial Landscape", in 
Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mappin~ Development, Frits Bouman and 
Otto Hospes. eds., Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 375-394. 
2 See Nagarajan, Geetha, Douglas H. Graham and Richard L. Meyer, "Financial 
Intermediation through ROSCAs in Peri-Urban Gambia", Columbus: Department of Agricultural 
Economics. The Ohio State University, Report Submitted to USAID/The Gambia, January 1994. 
3 This is not unique to the NGOs in The Gambia. For example, the groups used by 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh are small and homogenous in their membership. 
4 For example, floods or drought in a region may systematically negatively affect the 
incomes of all the farmers growing similar crops in that region. Therefore, groups composed of 
similarly impacted farmers may suffer high delinquency problems because the majority of 
members may simultaneously experience liquidity problems. 
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heterogeneity into their groups. A drawback is that increased heterogeneity may make groups 
vulnerable to mismatches in member interests and can reduce the information that group members 
have about each other needed for successful screening and monitoring functions required for good 
loan repayment. 
The net effect of membership homogeneity on group design and performance depends on 
the relative importance of informational advantages over reduction in covariance risks in a given 
environment. In static societies with limited migration and opportunities for income 
diversification, and a lack of external insurance, informational problems may be less important 
relative to risks due to income covariance. Furthermore, information problems may be important 
only for newly formed groups, and not for existing groups with stable membership. In other 
words, access to information may be a short-run problem, while risks due to covariance in 
incomes are a long-run problem. 
A well designed institution needs to allocate resources among its members in an optimal 
and sustainable fashion. While membership composition may not directly affect program 
sustainability, it may influence group design and performance thereby indirectly affecting 
sustainability. Therefore, it is important to assess the effect of membership composition on 
various components of group design, and examine if certain membership attributes can be 
heterogenous without affecting the optimal allocation of services to group members and their loan 
repayment performance. 
This paper presents an empirical analysis conducted to examine if the membership 
composition of indigenous financial groups explains group performance and the key components 
of group design that affect the services received by group members. While group performance 
is measured by delinquency and default rates, the value of services received by group members 
is primarily detennined by three components of group design: (i) membership size, (ii) fund size, 
and (iii) fund allocation methods. Data gathered in The Gambia from 88 indigenous rotating 
savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) called osusus are used to examine the propositions 
derived in this paper that relate membership composition with design characteristics and osusu 
performance 5• The design of indigenous RoSCAs emerges slowly over time through trial and 
error. The attributes of indigenous groups explain how they achieve sustainability. The factors 
found to explain the good experience of indigenous osusus, therefore, offer insights into the way 
that NGOs might design their financial groups to also achieve long-term sustainability. 
Differences in design between indigenous and NGO organized groups may represent areas that 
will threaten NGO sustainability. 
5 Indigenous osusus are formed by members themselves whereas NGO osusus are created 
by the NGOs. 
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II. Description of the Sample 
A random sample of 88 indigenous osusus with a total membership of 1,850 persons 
functioning in six villages surrounding the city of Banjul were selected for study. The leaders of 
the osusus were interviewed using a structured questionnaire during the February-April period of 
1993. The sample was limited to osusus composed of individuals primarily engaged in five 
general sets of economic activities: civil service, farming, food retailing, fruit and vegetable 
retailing, and tie-dye retailing. 
Osusus are indigenous associations that provide fmancial services to a wide variety of 
members employed in various occupations. In general, the members of an osusu agree to 
contribute a fixed amount of cash and/or goods into a common fund or pot at regular intervals 6• 
The pot is then allotted to one of the members (sometimes more) based upon some previously 
agreed criteria that may involve a fixed order of rotation, a lottery or a simple request. Each 
member contributes a fixed amount at each tum or rotation and receives the pot once until the 
entire cycle is completed; then the group may disband or the cycle may recommence with the 
same or a different set of members and terms and conditions. In order to capture the loan 
repayment performance of the groups, data were gathered for one cycle that was completed just 
prior to the interview. 
Table 1 presents selected features of the sampled osusus. The majority of these osusus 
were operating continuously for an average of 2.8 years. While 24% of the osusus reported 
changes in their membership size, 11 % altered their fund size between the reference cycle and the 
time of their origin. These changes reflected the flexibility of these groups to meet member 
requirements. The members saved small amounts 7 and the average amount of funds collected and 
allocated at each rotation was 1,314 Dalasis (US$ 155). The rotation occurred on an average 
every seven days. The size of funds varied, however, among the employment types with the 
largest pots collected by groups composed of civil servants and tie-dye sellers. The difference in 
fund size indicates differences in the incomes earned in different types of employment. Group 
size was small with an average membership of 21 persons. Membership size was similar among 
all employment types except the osusus composed of civil servants which tended to be smaller. 
The pots of funds were allocated in each rotation by random and non-random methods. 
While 58% of the sampled osusus followed random methods, 42% used non-random methods. 
The random methods included the use of lotteries or simple request options while the non-random 
methods included fixed-order arrangements and lotteries held at the beginning of each cycle. 
When the lottery method is used, it is held at the beginning of each osusu cycle or at every 
rotation of the pot. In the request method, the members determine the pot allocation based on 
6 The terms pot and fund are used interchangeably in this paper. 
7 Much larger RoSCAs have been reported in Cameroon and Niger where the volume of 
funds intermediated is large and comparable to that of formal credit unions. See Bouman, Frits, 
"ROSCA and ASCRA: Beyond the Financial Landscape", in Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: 
The Fine Art of MiWpin~ Deyelo_prnent, Frits Bouman and Otto Hospes, eds., Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994, pp. 375-394. 
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requests made by members desiring to receive it. This system usually works on a first-come first-
served basis, but members with emergencies, such as funerals, medical expenses, theft and frre, 
are given priority. In the fixed order method, members may receive the pot according to the 
order in which they are recruited into the osusu, or the order may be fixed according to member 
seniority measured by age or the number of hands played by a member 8, or by the number of 
members recruited by each member into the osusu. 
Delinquency due to late payments by members during the study period that covered one 
complete cycle prior to the interview was reported by 36% of osusus. The delinquent members 
represented only four percent of total members. Defaults in which members totally stopped 
paying their shares after receiving their pots were reported in 13% of the osusus, but defaulted 
members represented less than 1% of the total members. The delinquency and default rates were 
highest among farmer and tie-dye sellers compared to other employment types (table 1). In 
general, delinquency and default resulted in smaller pots being allocated to members. 
Occasionally, the group leader paid the share for a member who had a genuine reason for 
delinquency. Frequent delinquency and default resulted in the member being expelled from the 
group. Occasionally, delinquent members were given a strict warning and were allowed to 
continue participating in the group but were denied the privilege to request a pot early in the 
rotation. 
An examination of average fund size, membership size and pot allocation methods by 
repayment performance shows that fund and membership sizes were significantly higher among 
delinquent and defaulted osusus compared to non-delinquent and non-defaulted osusus. Osusus 
with delinquencies and defaults tended to allocate funds using non-random methods rather than 
random methods. Nonetheless, while no significant difference was noticed in method of pot 
allocation in delinquent osusus, there were differences among defaulted, non-delinquent and non-
defaulted osusus (table 2). 
While three fourths of the sampled osusus were composed of occupationally homogenous 
members, about two thirds were composed of members homogenous in age or gender. About half 
of the sampled osusus were simultaneously homogenous in gender, age and employment type. 
The members were considered homogenous in age if the age difference do not exceed 15 years, 
homogenous in gender if all members belong to one gender, and homogenous in employment if 
over 75% of the members were employed in one of the same five employment categories 
considered in this study. 
III. Conceptual Framework 
8 Hands refer to the number of contributions that a member makes at each rotation period. 
One member may contribute more than one hand in order to receive the pot more than once during 
the complete rotation. Alternatively, persons with insufficient cash may band together to 
contribute one hand. 
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Several analysts have argued that membership homogeneity is an essential component in 
the design of group based lending programs 9• The theory of clubs advanced to examine group 
dynamics argues that membership homogeneity reduces information problems. While information 
advantages exist for homogenous groups, two problems arise. First, there is the risk of crowding 
out in the distribution of group services due to the homogeneity in member preferences because 
of high covariance in the demand for financial services. This may result in congestion and 
queuing as several members desire a loan at the same time. This could give an opportunity for 
powerful group members to exert their influence and crowd out weaker ones 10• Second, 
delinquency and default rates may be higher due to a similarity in preferences and covariance in 
income flows. 
Let us assume that osusu members maximize their utility function with respect to the 
expected net benefits (Y) derived from participation in the group 11 • These net benefits include: 
(i) financial services through access to group funds, and (ii) insurance through reciprocity since 
cohesive group members with moral bonds will coinsure each other and reciprocate obligations 
in times of need. Therefore, Y consists of elements of the osusu design that ensures allocation 
of financial services to members in terms of fund size (F), membership size (M) and fund 
allocation methods (A) 12• Whereas the fund size determines the quantity of financial services that 
a member obtains from participating in a group, the fund allocation method determines the method 
9 For a review of group based lending programs, see Devereux, John and Raymond Fishe, 
P .H., "An Economic Analysis of Group Lending Programs in Developing Countries", ~ 
Developin~ Economies, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 102-121. 
10 See Comes, Richard and Todd Sandler, The Theorv of Externalities. Public Goods and 
Club Goods,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, and Sandler, Todd and John 
Tschirthart, "Club Theory: Thirty Years Later", Unpublished paper, Ames: Department of 
Economics, Iowa Stater University, 1994. 
11 This specification is an extension of the models proposed by Comes, Richard and Todd 
Sandler, The Theory of Externalities. Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, and Slover, Curtis H., "Informal Financial Groups in Rural Zaire: A 
Club Theory Approach", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus: Department of Agricultural 
Economics, The Ohio State University, 1991. 
12 The fund size refers to the size of pot that a member receivers at each rotation period. 
Evidence from The Gambia shows that due to delinquenc1es differences exist in size of funds 
received by each member in each rotation. Therefore, fund size may not be a simple linear 
combination of membership size. Also, members placed at the end of the cycle get smaller 
effective loans because most of their pot represents returned deposits rather than loans. See 
Schreiner, Mark, Douglas H. Graham and Geetha Nagarajan, "Predicting Creditworthiness with 
Publicly Observable Characteristics: Can Informal Finance Help Reform Formal Finance in 
Africa?", Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University, ESO 
No. 2220, 1995. 
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of access to loans. A larger membership size may reduce fixed costs per person in a group, but 
it also increases congestion and peer monitoring costs thus reducing the net value of services 
received by a member. 
Let the value of the group services be R and the costs incurred in participating in a group 
be C. These costs include fiXed and variable costs incurred for group formation and peer 
monitoring. Ceteris paribus, R and C are affected by membership composition (MC) and 
availability of member information (I). Let the other factors affecting R and C be N, a constant. 
The model can be written as: 
Max E ( U[Y(F,M,A)] ) (1) 
st. R(MC,l,N) - C(MC,I,N) ~ 0 
The performance of the group is also affected by membership composition which 
influences the availability of information and risks due to covariance in member incomes or 
preferences. Assume the probability of member delinquency/default to be d. It follows that 
members repay their loan obligations on time with a probability 1-d. Now, the model can be 
rewritten as: 
Max ~ = d (U [Y(F,M ,A)J - ). [R(MC,l,N) - C(MC,l,N)]) 
+ (1-d) (U [Y(F,M,A)J - ). [R(MC,l,N) - C(MC,l,N)]) 
(2) 
Maximization of equation 2 with respect to F ,M, A and d yields by implicit function theorem, 
F = f(MC,l) 
M = f(MC,l) 
A = f(MC,l) 
d = f(F,M ,A) = f(MC,[) 
(3) 
Membership composition can either be homogenous or heterogenous but the information needed 
to reduce costs can be importantly influenced through homogeneity among members leading to 
I = f(MC). Therefore, we can state that osusu design can affect the services demanded by 
members so that repayment performance importantly depends on membership composition. 
Members can be homogenous or heterogenous in age, gender, occupation, work place, residence 
and ethnicity. But given that our sample is invariably composed of members homogenous in their 
ethnic background and work place, the characteristics that appear to influence information the 
most are homogeneity in age, gender and employment types. The latter also affects the level and 
regularity of the member's income. Specifically, the following propositions can be derived from 
the above discussion for empirical validation using the Gambian data: 
Proposition 1: Member homogeneity in source of income has a negative effect on fund size. This 
is expected because while similarity in cashflows facilitates regular contributions by members, a 
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large covariance in cash flows will tend to decrease fund size when a region or occupation specific 
shock or disturbance occurs that affects many individuals simultaneously 13• 
Proposition 2: Member homogeneity can increase the information available to members because 
accessing the available information and interpreting its implications will be easier for persons who 
are similar rather than different from each other. Therefore, membership size, M, is expected to 
be higher in groups with homogenous rather than heterogenous members 14• However, with larger 
groups there is a possibility that the stronger members will crowd out the weaker ones in 
accessing group services. In addition, coinsurance among members will be reduced since group 
cohesiveness will likely be less in large groups. In places with no external insurance, the security 
offered by a group is valued highly by the members. This tendency would likely lead to smaller 
membership sizes for homogenous than for heterogenous groups. The net effect of homogeneity 
on membership size, therefore, is ambiguous. 
Proposition 3: Homogeneity in income sources and level will lead to members choosing random 
rather than non-random methods of fund allocation methods 15• This is due to the potential 
synchronization in demand for funds by members with similar preferences in a homogenous 
group. Therefore, randomness in pot allocation will be preferred to help prevent politically 
stronger members from overriding weaker ones in access to the pots. 
Proposition 4: The effect of membership homogeneity on group performance measured by 
delinquency and default in member payments is ambiguous. While a high covariance risk among 
members in homogeneous compared to heterogenous osusus will lead to higher delinquency and 
default in member payments due to unforeseen and uninsured events, the availability of 
information among members will facilitate better screening and peer monitoring leading to lower 
default and delinquency rates due to moral hazard problems. Nonetheless, in close communities 
with no external insurance, covariance risks may more than offset informational advantages 
leading a homogenous osusu to experience low repayment rates. 
These four propositions are tested in the following section. 
IV. Econometric Estimation and Results 
It is posrulated that an osusu with a more homogenous membership composition will have 
a larger membership size, will intermediate smaller sized funds, will allocate funds using random 
rather than non-random methods, and will have poorer repayment performance compared to 
osusus composed of heterogenous members. Since the fund and membership sizes are continuous 
variables, a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) procedure is applied to test the hypotheses. A 
13 This is expected to be particularly relevant for farmers. 
14 See Slover, Curtis H., "Informal Financial Groups in Rural Zaire: A Club Theory 
Approach", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics, 
The Ohio State University, 1991. 
15 See Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate and Glenn Loury, "The Economics of Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations", American Economic Review Vol. 82, June 1993, pp. 792-810. 
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binomial legit model is used to estimate the fund allocation equation (ROTATION TYPE) where 
the dependent variable takes the value of zero for a random method and one for non-random 
method of fund allocation. Also a binomial legit model is used to estimate the determinants of 
the probability of delinquency (default) where the dependent variable takes the zero value for non-
delinquent (non-defaulted) osusus and one for delinquent (defaulted) osusus. 
The explanatory variables include dummy variables for homogeneity in gender 
(GENDER), age (AGE) and employment type (EMPLOY) of the members, where the variables 
take the value one in the presence of homogeneity, and zero otherwise. The employment 
categories include dummy variables for civil service (CIVIL), farming (FARM), food retailing 
(FOOD), fruit and vegetable retailing (F&V) and tie-dye retailing (TIE-DYE). 
Two reduced form models, one for all employment types and the other for the sample 
disaggregated by employment types, are estimated for each of the fund size, membership size and 
fund allocation equations. The regression results are presented in table 3. The results from both 
the models generally confirm the postulates presented above. Surprisingly, homogeneity in gender 
did not affect fund size, membership size and fund allocation methods in either of the models; 
similarly, homogeneity in age, gender and employment did not affect membership size and fund 
allocation methods under either model. Our results are consistent with a study whose results 
showed that homogeneity in gender and age does not significantly affect fund size and membership 
size in rotating and non-rotating informal groups in Zaire 16• Income generating capacity and 
preferences of the members are generally affected by their age and employment type. Therefore, 
our hypothesis regarding the effect of homogeneity in member income generating capacity on size 
of funds intermediated is confirmed by the results in both models that show that homogeneity in 
age and employment tend to reduce fund size. 
The results from model two in table 3 additionally show that while fund size is smaller in 
osusus composed of farmers, it is larger in osusus made of civil servants and tie-dye workers. 
Membership size tends to be smaller in osusus composed of civil servants compared to other 
employment types. The random method of pot allocation is chosen only by osusus homogenous 
in members employed in civil services and tie-dye selling. This result is consistent with previous 
studies that showed that RoSCAs that were formed among civil servants to purchase some 
indivisible good preferred a random lottery method of pot allocation 17 • 
Two reduced form equations are estimated for each of the determinants of delinquency and 
default in the osusus and the results are presented in table 4. The results in model 1 show that 
16 See Slover, Curtis H., "Informal Financial Groups in Rural Zaire: A Club Theory 
Approach", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics, 
The Ohio State University, 1991. 
17 See Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate and Glenn Loury, "The Economics of Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations", American Economic Review, Vol. 82, Jkune 1993, pp. 792-
810, and Besley, Timothy and Alec Levenson, ''The Role of Informal Finance in Household 
Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Taiwan", Research Program in Development Studies, 
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Working Paper, June 1993. 
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membership homogeneity does not affect delinquency and default of members. The results, 
however, do not adequately support postulate 4 laid out earlier but are consistent with a study that 
reported an insignificant correlation between membership homogeneity and delinquency rates 
. c Ri 18 among groups m osta ca . In fact, the results showed that groups heterogenous in member 
income earning capacity and project rates of returns reported lower delinquency rates than 
homogenous groups. High delinquency rates were significantly related to weak leadership. 
It is possible that delinquency and default rates are more directly affected by design 
elements than by membership composition. Therefore, an alternative specification was estimated 
using predicted values of design characteristics, obtained from model 1 presented in table 3, as 
explanatory variables. The results are presented as model 2 in table 4. The results support the 
above argument and suggest a two stage process wherein membership composition affects design 
features in the first stage which in turn affects repayment performance in the second stage. 
Delinquency and default rates increase with increases in fund size, membership size and non-
random type of pot allocation. 19 The results lend support to the theoretical literature that predicts 
low repayment rates for larger loans and for groups composed of larger membership due to 
asymmetric information leading to increased moral hazard problems and reduced peer 
monitoring. 20 The positive and significant association between delinquency, default and non-
random type of pot allocation may be attributed to the fact that there exists some free rider 
problem wherein some members tend to shirk their obligations once they have perfect knowledge 
on the time of their receipt of the pot. 21 
These results may be considered as first order approximations since several other variables 
besides homogeneity in membership composition are assumed constant in affecting membership 
18 See Wenner, Mark, "Signalling of Credit Worthiness in Rural Credit Markets: An 
Analysis of Group Lending in Costa Rica", University of Wisconsin-Madison: Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1989. Measures of homogeneity 
included age, gender, ethnicity, civil status, years of residence in the community and education 
level. 
19 The results did not change when actual values for design features were used. This 
shows that dessign features incorporate the effects of membership composition. 
10 See Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 351-366. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
provides small loans to small groups made up of five members and reports a loan repayment rate 
above 90%. See Pitt, Mark M. and Shahidur R. Khandker, ·• Household and Intrahousehold 
Impacts of the Grameen Bank and Similar Targeted Credit Programs in Bangladesh", Paper 
presented at the World Bank/BIDS sponsored workshop on Credit Programs for the Poor held in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, March 19-22, 1995. 
21 While the non-random method gives greater chances for opportunistic behavior since 
the member can influence the timing of receipt of the pot, the random selection at each rotation 
prevents a 'hit and run' strategy. 
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size, fund size, fund allocation methods and repayment performance. However, structural models 
were tested with simultaneity among the fund size, membership size, fund allocation methods and 
repayment performance. Those results did not contradict the results obtained from the reduced 
form specifications presented in this paper. The independent variables in the structural models 
included variables, such as cycle length, number of years of continuous operation of the osusu, 
locality, and the number of new members added during the reference cycle from the previous 
cycle, in addition to the proxies for membership homogeneity. This may be due in part to the 
limited availability of independent variables that can be used as instruments in a simultaneous 
specification. Also the study is limited by a lack of information about leadership capabilities that 
can importantly affect loan repayments. Nonetheless, the reasonable fit of the models, and the 
efficient and consistent estimates obtained through MLE and logit procedures contributes statistical 
support to the propositions outlined above. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Indigenously formed osusus provide valuable financial services to low income persons who 
have limited access to formal financial services in The Gambia. Recently, NGOs have become 
active in using existing indigenous osusus or creating new osusu-like groups to channel their 
financial services to villagers. Whereas traditional osusus are observed to be generally 
homogenous in their membership composition, NGOs are attempting to include heterogenous 
members in order to diversify the loan portfolios of their groups and to reduce default risks. But 
a mismatch between the design of NGO osusus and member interests could lead to unsustainable 
groups. 
This paper examined if membership homogeneity affects the design features and repayment 
performance in 88 indigenous RoSCAs in The Gambia. The results show that homogeneity in 
gender is less likely to affect the size of funds intermediated, membership size and method of fund 
allocation compared to homogeneity in income generating capacity among members reflected in 
member age and employment types. In addition, while member homogeneity in employment types 
reduces fund size, the random method of pot allocation is chosen only by osusus homogenous in 
members employed in civil services. Therefore, the results suggest that NGOs can form mixed 
gender groups without contradicting the elements of design found in indigenous groups. Many 
advocates of special services for women, however, argue that men may dominate groups for their 
own benefit so they often support women-only groups. The issue of heterogeneity in occupation 
and age appears to be more crucial because increased homogeneity in both variables is associated 
with smaller fund size and random methods of fund allocation. This conclusion implies that the 
ease of obtaining and evaluating information about more homogenous group members is more than 
offset by the disadvantage of similar time preferences among similar aged members and high 
covariance in the demand for funds associated with similar occupations. 
The results also suggest that group performance as measured by delinquency and default 
rates is more directly affected by design characteristics than by membership composition. Poor 
repayment performance was observed in osusus with larger fund size and membership size, and 
that used non-random methods of pot allocation. Membership composition seems to be an 
important concern in designing the groups in order to enhance the net benefits obtained from 
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participating in a group which consequently affects repayment performance and group 
sustainability. 
These conclusions reached in this study may be unique to this particular sample and 
country observed during the limited study period. However, the study points out the need to 
carefully evaluate the characteristics of indigenous groups which contribute to their long-term 
sustainability. Introducing different characteristics in specially formed groups could introduce 
instability and destroy their efforts to achieve long-term sustainability. Much more needs to be 
known about the characteristics of indigenous groups and the factors that contribute to their 
durability before we can be confident that NGO created fmancial self-help groups are likely to 
become permanent, sustainable sources of fmancial services for the poor. 
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Table 1. General Characteristics of the Sampled Indigenous RoSCAs in The Gambia • 
Type of Osusu 
members 
Civil servants 
Farmers 
Food vendors 
Fruit and vegetable 
vendors 
Tie-dye sellers 
Total 
No. of 
OS USUS 
sampled 
8 
IS 
5 
52 
8 
88 
Ave.no. 
of 
members 
15 
21 
21 
23 
21 
21 
Percent 
of female 
members 
87 
90 
98 
89 
95 
92 
Ave. pot 
size per 
rotation 
(D)b 
2,690 
136 
450 
535 
2,150 
1,314 
Pot allocation 
methods (percent of 
osusus reporting) 
Random 
75 
33 
60 
60 
75 
58 
Non-
random 
25 
67 
40 
40 
25 
42 
Delinquencies 
(percent reporting) 
Osusus Members 
13 2 
67 5 
40 2 
27 4 
63 8 
36 4 
a. Indigenous RoSCAs are formed by the members themselves while NGO RoSCAs are formed by the NGOs. 
b. Dalassi 8.52 = US $One. 
Defaults 
(Percent reporting) 
Osusus Members 
0 0 
40 2 
0 0 
8 0.3 
13 
13 0.6 
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Table 2. Selected Statistics, by Delinquency and Default Status of Osusu Members. 
Delinquency status Default status 
Item Yes No Yes No 
Number of osusus 32 56 11 77 
Average fund size (Dalassis) 2214 828 ** 1090 1346 * 
(5964) (1317) (1075) (3947) 
Average number of members 28.8 19.9 ** 33.1 21.7 ** 
(19.3) (11. 7) (23.6) (13.5) 
Nutnber of osusus with random pot 15 36 4 47 
allocation 
20} # 7}# 30} # Number of osusus with non-random pot 17 
allocation 
Standard deviation given in parentheses. 
**, *represent significant difference between delinquent (default) and non-delinquent (non-default) osusus based on 
t-statistics at 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
#represent significant difference within delinquent, defaulted, non-delinquent and non-defaulted osusus based on t-
statistics at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Regression Results for Determinants of Fund Size, Membership Size and Fund 
Allocation Methods in Indigenous RoSCAs in The Gambia 
Variables a Fund Size (MLE) Membership Size Fund Allocation 
(MLE) Method (Logit) 
(Non-random = 1) 
Modell Model2 Model 1 Model2 Modell Model2 
Constant 4195.9*** 792.2*** 18.69*** 20.12** -0.71 *** -0.182 
(1738.1) (247.9) (7.6) (8.8) (0.52) (0.268) 
GENDER -153.4 -142.1 3.646 3.87 -0.72 -0.63 
(141.4) (136.1) (6.2) (6.1) (0.57) (0.53) 
AGE -2376.3*** -420.9 2.04 1.68 0.69 0.39 
(781.1) (969.1) (3.4) (2.2) (0.65) (0.28) 
EMPLOY -1514.9* -0.44 0.27 
(927.1) (4.1) (0.32) 
F&V 231.70 1.02 -0.32 
(238. 1) (6.1) (0.44) 
FARM -5.348*** 5.12 0.49 
(2.5) (8.7) (0.32) 
CML 253.61 *** -8.55* -0.29** 
(151.3) (6.4) (0.14) 
TIE&DYE 161.28** 2.95 -0.48** 
(111.3) (8.4) (0.22) 
R2/log- 0.43 0.46 0.82 0.45 -60.7 -52.86 
likelihood -871.1 -858.5 -3766.8 -374.9 
Chi-square 15.6 ** 15.5 ** 
Asymptotic standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***, **and* represent significance at 1,5 and 10%, respectively. 
a. All independent variables are expressed as dummy variables where homogeneity is represented 
by 1. 
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Table 4. Logit Regression Results for Determinants of Delinquency in Indigenous 
RoSCAs in The Gambia 
Variables Delinquency Default 
Modell Model2 a Modell Model2 a 
Constant -0.98 -2.22*** -3.72** -3.28*** 
(1.3) (0.6) (1.7) (0.8) 
GENDER 1.10 -0.04 
(1.1) (1.1) 
AGE -0.38 -1.03 
(0.5) (0.8) 
EMPLOY -0.59 -1.12 
(0.5) (1.1) 
FUND SIZE 0.34* 0.31* 
(0.1) (0.1) 
MEMBERSHIP SIZE 0.48*** 0.54** 
(0.1) (0.2) 
ROTATION TYPE 0.87* 0.82* 
(NON-RANDOM) (0.4) (0.4) 
Log-likelihood -114.6 -103.11 -63.99 -69.31 
Chi-square 3.45 13.51 ** 2.74 8.65* 
Asymptotic standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***, **and* represent significance at 1,5 and 10%, respectively. 
a. Model uses predicted values of fund size, membership size and rotation type obtained from 
model 1 presented in table 3. 
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